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Akron Law Review
THE MOBILE HOME AND THE LAW
MARVIN

M. MOORE*

I. INTRODUCTION
N THE PAST DECADE house trailers have dramatically increased their
share of the housing market in the United States.
Production of mobile home units nearly doubled between 1966 and
1969.' Over 400,000 units were produced in the latter year, over 500,000
are being built in 1972,2 and today one out of every two single-family
3
dwellings being constructed in this country is a house trailer. Mobile
homes now account for over ninety percent of all new single-family homes
in the under-$15,000 price category, 4 and six and one-half million
Americans now live in house trailerss most of which are located in
6
the 23,000 trailer parks scattered across the United States.
The manner in which mobile homes are dealt with under our zoning
laws is therefore a matter of some importance. Surprisingly, comparatively
little has been written regarding the zoning of mobile homes and trailer
parks. The purpose of this article is to lessen this deficiency. The writer
proposes to examine the subject by considering the following aspects of
mobile home regulation: the need for mobile homes or a similar type
of housing; the objectionable features of house trailers and trailer parks;
the constitutional and legislative authority to regulate trailer homes and
trailer courts; the specific zoning restrictions employed by American
communities; the classification of mobile homes as nonconforming uses,
and the regulation of house trailers by means of private covenants.

II. THE NEED FOR MOBILE HOMES OR COMPARABLE HOUSING
The present popularity of mobile homes is attributable much less to
their mobility-a characteristic which the larger models possess only to a
* B.A., Wayne State University; J.D., LL.M., J.S.D., Duke University, 1968. Professor
of Law, The University of Akron School of Law.
I Bus. WEEx, Jan. 24, 1970, at 36.

2 Akron Beacon Journal, May 1, 1972, Part B, at 8, col. 1.
3Id. at 4.
4 Akron Beacon Journal, Sept. 7, 1972, Part B, at 6, col. 1. Shipments of mobile
homes in the first half of 1972 were twenty-seven percent ahead of the same period
in 1971. Id.
5Akron Beacon Journal, August 27, 1972, Part F, at 10, col. 1. It is anticipated that
13% million Americans will be living in mobile homes by 1980. Supra note 4.
6 SAT. REv., Sept. 23, 1972, at 53.
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limited degree anyway-than to their comparative inexpensiveness. It is
of
undersupply
no secret that for several years there has been a serious
8
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result of factors such as high labor costs, rising land prices, continued
farm-to-suburb and inner city-to-suburb migration, and the large pool
of young home seekers occasioned by the baby boom of the late 1940's
and early 1950's, the $10,000 home has gone the way of the dinosaur, and
the $15,000 home has become scarce in those areas where most Americans
want to live. Efforts to manufacture homes in factories, with the components being shipped to the home site and assembled there, have achieved
some success, 9 but cost savings have so far proved disappointing. 10 The
result has been a rapid expansion of the mobile home industry" and
a great increase in the number of persons who live in house trailers.

III. OBJECTIONS TO MOBILE HOMES AND TRAILER PARKS
If the house trailer has helped to alleviate one problem, the housing
shortage, it has served to create others; for while it has become apparent
that a large number of persons are willing to live in house trailers, it has
become equally obvious that many people are unwilling to live near
mobile homes, especially when they are concentrated in trailer parks. To
some extent the widespread hostility toward trailer parks is attributable
to memories of past conditions, some of which have been largely
corrected. Thirty years ago there was very little to be said in favor of the
house trailer or of the typical trailer camp of which it was a part. In
1942 the average mobile home was only seven feet wide and seventeen

7 While mobile home prices vary considerably, with the cost being affected by such

variables as length, width, furnishings, and brand name, the typical purchaser buys
a $7,000-$9,000 sixty-foot model. Id. at 53-54.
s According to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, to
achieve Congress' goal of decent housing for every American family 2.6 million units

must be built every year for the next ten years. Van Iden, Zoning Restrictions Applied
to Mobile Homes, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 196 (1971).

9 This success has fallen considerably short of what was once expected, because of
labor union resistance, the difficulty of complying with local building codes, and the
cost of transporting the modules, among other factors. Within recent years two large
modular home manufacturing operations, Alsides Aluminum, Inc., and Stirling
Homex, have failed. See Wall Street Journal, August 14, 1972, Part A, at 4.
'OAccording to Akron, Ohio, attorney Herbert Newman, Assistant Director of Akron
Metropolitan Housing Authority for the years 1970-71, in Ohio the cost savings on a
modular home, as compared to a conventional house, are "not substantial," "no more
than ten percent, if that." Address delivered by Newman at The University of Akron
School of Law on April 20, 1972.
11 Mobile home production was the second largest dynamics growth industry in the
United States in 1971, with the average industry-wide increase on the New York and
American stock exchanges running at 74.6 percent. Half of the leading stock gainers

on the American exchange last year were mobile home producers. University of
California Institute of Governmental Studies, 24 CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SUaVEY 37 (1972).
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12
The
feet long, and was equipped with neither toilet nor shower.
twelve-foot-wide trailer was not introduced until 1962, and the so-called
"double-wide" mobile home did not come into being until 1965.13 The
attractive carpeting and elegant upholstering found in many mobile homes
today were rarely seen in the house trailers of the 1930's and 1940's.
Many of today's trailer parks have made comparable advances over their

counterparts of thirty years ago. The typical trailer court-then called
"trailer camp"--of the thirties and forties had the sordid appearance of
a shanty-town. The lot sizes were usually small, with the result that the
trailers were located extremely close to one another. The driveways into
the camp and between the trailers were seldom paved, and landscaping
was usually nonexistent. Efforts to keep the grounds neat and free of
clutter were typically perfunctory. The occupants consisted mainly of
14
migrant workers, drifters and gypsy types. By contract, many-though
certainly not all-of today's trailer parks are attractively landscaped,
well-maintained, paved in the driveway strips, and divided into reasonably
roomy lots. It should be noted, however, that even today few trailer parks
provide lots comparable in size with those found in the average residential
subdivision.' 5 Aside from a few parks (found mostly in the South) which
cater to retired persons, most modern-day trailer courts are occupied
primarily by relatively young middle-class families having slightly fewer
children per unit than the average American family and having a
household head who has a steady job.16 In summary, the individual
mobile home has come a long way since the 1930's and many of the
trailer parks in which it is found have made comparable progress. It
follows, therefore, that much of the stigma that still affects mobile
homes and trailer parks is no longer justified.
There are other reasons, however, why people object to having trailer
parks in their proximity, and it is difficult to dismiss these reasons as
being without substance. The major objection is that while trailer courts
generate tax revenue, in the form of property taxes and license fees, the
amount of revenue generated is normally significantly less than the costs
which the trailer parks impose on the community, in the form of such
things as teacher salaries, school building additions, trunk sewer lines,
water lines, police and fire protection, and road construction and
maintenance. The result is that the rest of the community is compelled to

l2 Renker v. Village of Brooklyn, 139 Ohio St. 484, 488, 40 N.E.2d 925, 927 (1942).
13Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxation, 55 CORNELL L. RaV. 491,
495 (1970).
14 R. NEEDHAM, MOBILE HOMES: LEGAL. AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS 29 (1971).
1sThe new trailer parks average six to eight units per acre, as compared to twelve to

sixteen units per acre in the older parks. Supra note 2, at col. 2.
l Supra note 13, at 495.
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subsidize the occupants of the trailer court. 17 Of the aforementioned
expenses the single biggest item is educational costs. Even though the
average mobile home family unit contains fewer children than does
the average American family unit,18 trailer parks nevertheless usually
produce a substantially larger number of children for the local school
system to accommodate than would the same amount of land devoted to
some other residential use, such as single family residences, duplexes, or
garden apartments. The reason is, a given parcel of land devoted to trailer
park use will contain a larger number of family units than would the same
amount of land allocated to a conventional residential use. Another
commonly voiced objection to trailer courts is that they have a detrimental
effect on the aesthetics of the community. A trailer park, even when well
planned, landscaped, and carefully maintained, rarely constitutes a visually
appealing addition to a locality. Finally, it is generally conceded that the
intrusion of a mobile home court normally has a depressing effect on
property values in a middle- or upperclass residential area.1 9
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
To REGULATE MOBILE HOMES
The authority of a political subdivision to zone rests either on an
express provision in the state constitution or on enabling legislation
enacted by the state legislature. 20 The power to regulate house trailers
is, of course, grounded on these same sources. In practice a majority of
the states have enacted enabling acts authorizing municipalities and
townships to regulate mobile homes.21 Since these enabling statutes
and the local ordinances enacted pursuant to same, rest constitutionally
on the state's police power, all such legislation must be designed to
22
promote the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
That the regulation of mobile homes is related to the health,
safety, morals and general welfare of the community is obvious. For
example, a trailer park being served by inadequate sanitation facilities
may adversely affect the health of the community, and the nomadic

17

[Al method must be devised to require these homes to be appraised as real
property and taxed as such, or a separate taxing technique must be evolved
which will achieve an equitable tax burden among those residents who enjoy the
services purchased with tax dollars. Failure to accomplish this results in an
unfair tax burden on the owners of conventional homes, and it arouses

additional antagonism against mobile home owners.
2 R. AbmERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 362-63 (1968).
Is One writer estimates that mobile home families average 0.5 children per dwelling
unit. Supra note 14, at 20.
19 Supra note 17, at 361.
20C. SMrIH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 427 (1971).
21 Germain, Regulation of Mobile Homes, 13 SYRACusE L. Rav. 125, 127 (1961).
22
Supra note 13, at 496.
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habits of some mobile home dwellers may give rise to morals or other
23
law enforcement problems
Heretofore, in deciding whether a trailer park or a mobile home could
constitutionally be regulated as attempted, the courts have been concerned
mainly with whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was violated. This is explained by the fact that when there is an abuse
of the police power the result is a taking of private property without due
24
process of law. An illustrative case is Duse v. Wilhelm, where the
township zoned plaintiff's land for single family residential use even
though the property was located in an area where no one could ever
25
reasonably be expected to build a conventional single-family residence.
The Mahoning County Common Pleas Court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff's land, being violative of the due
process clause. The court said that if a parcel of land cannot feasibly and
economically be used for the restricted purposes for which it is zoned,
then it is confiscatory and transgressive of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Occasionally the courts have ruled that a mobile home ordinance
violated the due process clause simply because there did not appear to be
any substantial relation between the regulation in question and the furtherance of any recognized police power goal. The court so held in the New
26
York case of Koston v. Newburgh, for example, where an ordinance
which entirely excluded trailer courts from the municipality was invalidated.
In the near future, as mobile homes serve an increasingly large
segment of the housing market and provide dwellings for increasing
numbers of the less affluent, it is quite possible that the courts will be
asked to invalidate strongly restrictive anti-trailer legislation on the
ground that it constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection clause, by discriminating against the poor. This argument
has already been advanced, with limited success, in cases dealing with
zoning ordinances imposing large minimum lot sizes. For example, in
National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of
Adjustment, 2 the court declared unconstitutional an ordinance requiring
lot sizes of at least four acres, saying:
It is not difficult to envision the tremendous hardship, as well as the
23

[TIhe congestion of living conditions inherent in a trailer park, together with the
uncertainty as to sanitary conditions, including water, sewage, cooking, bathing
and washing facilities, and the fact that the occupants of a trailer park may be
to a large extent transitory, are all very patent reasons why such a business is so
affected with a public interest as to make it a proper subject for legislative
regulation under the broad police powers of the state.

Nichols v. Pirkle, 202 Ga. 372, 43 S.E.2d 306, 308 (1947).
2425 Ohio Misc. 111, 266 N.E.2d 280 (C.P. 1970).
25 The land was located next to an existing trailer park and across the street from

a coal tipple.
2645 Misc.2d 283, 256 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
27419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1967).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1973

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 6 [1973], Iss. 1, Art. 1

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:1

chaotic conditions which would result if all the townships in this
area decided to deny to a growing population sites for residential
development within the means of at least a significant segment of
the people.... The question posed is whether a township can stand
in the way of the natural forces which send our growing population
into hitherto under-developed areas
in search of a comfortable place
28
to live. We have concluded not.
And in Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders29 the same court ruled invalid
a zoning ordinance which required a minimum lot size of two acres along
existing roads and of three acres in the interior, stating:
A scheme of zoning that has an exclusionary purpose or result is not
acceptable in Pennsylvania.... It is not for any given township to
say who may or who may not live within its confines, while
disregarding the interests of the entire area.... A zoning ordinance
whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in
order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the
administration of public services and facilities cannot be held valid.
... [Tihis problem.., cannot realistically be detached from the rights
of other people desirous of moving into the area in search of a
comfortable place to live. 30
However, the undeniable fact that many persons cannot afford to live
in a conventional house does not change the equally indisputable fact
that the establishment of a trailer park (or even an individual mobile
home) in the midst of a development of conventional homes can have
some very harmful effects on the area. It would therefore seem more
realistic and reasonable to merely demand that a given mobile home
ordinance promote a legitimate police power goal and otherwise comply
with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

28

Id. at 528, 532, 215 A.2d at 610, 612.

Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
30 Id. at 470, 472, 268 A.2d at 766, 768, 769. Dissenting Justice Oliphant advanced a
similar argument in Lionshead Lake, Inc., v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d
693 (1952), where the issue was the validity of a township ordinance prescribing a

29439

minimum floor space:
[Als I conceive the effect of the majority opinion, it precludes individuals in
those income brackets who could not pay between $8500 and $12,000 for the
erection of a house on a lot from ever establishing a residence in this
community as long as the 768 square feet of living space is the minimum

requirement in the zoning ordinance.... Certain well behaved families will be
barred from these communities, not because of any acts they do or conditions
they create, but simply because the income of the family will not permit them
to build a house at the cost testified to in this case. They will be relegated to

living in the large cities or in multiple-family dwellings even though it be against
what they consider the welfare of their immediate families.
Id. at 181-182, 89 A.2d at 701.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss1/1

6

Moore: The Mobile Home and The Law

Winter, 19731

THE MOBILE HOME AND THE LAW

V. COMPLETE EXCLUSION OF MOBILE HOMES
The most obvious, and drastic, approach for a community to adopt,
if it desires to avoid the evils, real and imagined, associated with house
trailers, is to entirely ban mobile homes from the community's political
boundaries. In many instances municipalities and townships have availed
3
themselves of this option. 1 In a majority of the states in which this
the total
the courts have ruled that
challenged
been
approach has
32
invalid.
exclusion of house trailers from a political unit is
The rationale usually adopted by the courts is that since trailers and
trailer courts are not inherently detrimental to the public health, morals,
or general welfare, a complete prohibition of mobile homes from the
municipality is an abuse of the police power. Illustrative cases are Smith
34
33
Ordinance.
v. Building Inspector and In re Falls Township Trailer
In Smith, the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed a judgment
granting a writ of mandamus compelling the Plymouth Township building
inspector to issue a permit for the construction of trailer park facilities
notwithstanding the existence of an ordinance disallowing trailer courts in
Plymouth Township. Said the court:
...[S]ince the trailer camps are not, as a matter of law, nuisances
per se or detrimental to public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare, it could not be said that their complete prohibition in
to the
Plymouth Township bears a real and substantial relationship 35
promotion of public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
In the Falls Township controversy the Bucks County District Court
held invalid an ordinance forbidding mobile homes throughout the
township, declaring:
While it may be that the manner of use and occupation of a house
trailer might, under particular circumstances, constitute a nuisance
in fact, such possibility provides no warrant for outlawing them
entirely.... In our opinion.. . although the ... Supervisors undoubtedly have power to adopt ... zoning ordinances... which might
regulate house trailers as part of the general scheme thereof,
nevertheless they have not authority36to single out trailers and flatly
to prohibit them within the township.

31 In New York, for example, a recent study disclosed that forty-two of the forty-four
municipalities comprising Westchester County entirely prohibit mobile homes within
their borders. Supra note 14, at 33.
32

Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 232, 235 (1964).
33 346 Mich. 57, 77 N.W.2d 332 (1956).
34 84 Pa. D. & C. 199, 44 Muni. L.R. 33 (C.P. 1952).
35 346 Mich. at 60, 77 N.W.2d at 335.
36 84 Pa. D. & C. at 205, 209. Accord, Koston v. Newburgh, 45 Misc.2d 382, 256
N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1965), and Jackson & Perkins Co. v. Martin, 12 N.Y.2d 1082,
190 N.E.2d 422 (1963).
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Another reason advanced by some courts against the validity of an
ordinance entirely excluding house trailers from a municipality is that
the legislature of that state has provided for the regulation of mobile
homes and that the regulation of a thing presupposes its existence
somewhere in the political subdivision. This line of reasoning was adopted
in Gust v. Township oj Canton.3 7 In the Gust case, the Supreme Court of
Michigan affirmed a decree enjoining the Township of Canton from
enforcing an ordinance forbidding the establishment or operation of
a trailer camp anywhere in the township, stating:
Trailer camps may be lawfully operated in Michigan under... [cited
statutes] which provide for the licensing and regulation thereof...
[T]he nature and extent of the development of the township, or lack
of it, are such that it cannot be said that. .. prohibiting trailer camps
therefrom bears a real and substantial relationship to the present
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare .... To so hold would
be tantamount to declaring trailer camps.., subject to exclusion
from every area in the state by local governing bodies. That would
hardly square with the legislative intent expressed in the above act
38
authorizing their operation in Michigan.
A few states have sustained the total prohibition of mobile homes
from the community. Among these jurisdictions are New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Ohio. 39 In City of Raleigh
v. Morand40 the Supreme Court of North Carolina sustained and enforced
by injunction an ordinance which banned house trailers not only from the
city itself but also from a one-mile belt around the city. The court merely
relied on the canon under which an ordinance is presumed to be valid
until the contrary is shown. Quoting from the opinion:
...[T]here is a presumption that the zoning ordinance of the City of
Raleigh constitutes a proper exercise of the police power. The burden
was upon the appellants ... to show otherwise .... The defendants
have failed to carry the burden in this respect .... We hold that the
ordinance under consideration ... is a valid exercise of the police
power and may be enforced by injunctive relief.4 '
In Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester Township 42 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey sustained a zoning ordinance amendment

342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955).
342 Mich. at 438-39, 70 N.W.2d at 773.
39Plainfield v. Hood, 108 N.H. 502, 240 A.2d 60 (1968); Hohl v. Readington, 37
N.J. 271, 181 A.2d 150 (1962); Raleigh v. Morand, 247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d 870
(1957); Midgarden v. Grand Forks, 79 N.D. 18, 54 N.W.2d 659 (1952), and Carlton
v. Riddle, 58 Ohio Op. 380, 132 N.E.2d 272 (1955).
40247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d 870 (1957).
41247 N.C. at 368, 100 S.E.2d at 874.
42 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
37
38
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prohibiting trailer parks in an industrial zone, the only district in the
Township in which they had been allowed. Said the court:
[I]f the amendment presented a debatable issue, we cannot nullify the
township's decision that its welfare would be advanced by the action
it took. It cannot be said that every municipality must provide for
every use somewhere within its borders .... Trailer camps, because of
their particular nature and relation to the public health, safety, morals
and general welfare, present a municipality with a host of problems,
43
located.
and these problems persist wherever such camps are
Taking advantage of New Jersey's law on this matter, two-thirds of
New Jersey's six hundred municipalities have disallowed trailer parks
altogether. 44 Jurisdictions which permit the complete exclusion of mobile
homes from their political subdivisions leave themselves open to the
accusation that they are sanctioning a form of discrimination against
the poor, who cannot afford the purchase price of a conventional
suburban home. Although a municipality with an exclusionary ordinance
may in fact be actuated by perfectly legitimate motives, its failure to
make provision for house trailers somewhere within its political limits
leaves it vulnerable to the charge that it is violating the spirit, if not the
45
Amendment.
letter, of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
VI. INDIRECT EXCLUSION OF MOBILE HOMES
Some communities, deeming it imprudent to attempt a direct, total
exclusion of mobile homes from their political boundaries, have instead
adopted a more discreet approach and have employed indirect and subtle
means of keeping out mobile homes. When challenged and identified as a
contrivance, this kind of approach has usually been deemed invalid for the
same reasons that a direct, complete exclusion is generally considered

37 N.J. at 242, 246, 181 A.2d at 134, 136-37.
Ring, The Mobile Home, 25 URBAN LAND 4 (1966).
45 In the Vickers case the dissenting opinion of Justice Hall addressed itself to this
43
44

point as follows:

In my opinion legitimate use of the zoning power by such municipalities does
not encompass the right to erect barricades on their boundaries through
exclusion or too rigid restriction of uses where the real purpose is to prevent
feared disruptions with a so-called chosen way of life. Nor does it encompass
or
provisions designed to let in as new residents only certain kinds of people the
those who can afford to live in favored kinds of housing, or to keep down
situation
true
is
the
bills of the present property owners. When one of the above
deeper considerations intrinsic in a free society gain the ascendency and courts
must not be hesitant to strike down purely selfish and undemocratic enactments.
I am not suggesting that every such municipality must endure a plague of
locusts or suffer transition to a metropolis overnight. I suggest only that
regulation rather than prohibition is the appropriate technique for attaining a
balanced and attractive community....
37 N.J. at 264-265, 181 A.2d at 147.
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invalid. Illustrative cases so holding are Zoning Board of Adjustment
v. Dragon Run Terrace46 and Anderson v. Township of Highland.47
In the former case the approach adopted by the county was to
provide in the ordinance that trailer parks are permitted as special
exceptions in Residential 2 and Residential 4 districts, provided that
they comply with designated conditions; however, whenever a landowner
applied for such a special exception his application would be denied. The
Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed a judgment ordering the Board
of Adjustment to grant the petitioner's application for a special exception,
subject to the petitioner's complying with the conditions specified in
the ordinance. Said the court:
[T]he Board is empowered to refuse the subject permit if its issuance
would result in substantial injury to the neighborhood and county. In
the absence of any substantial evidence in the record of such
substantial injury, the refusal of the Board to issue the permit
48
must fall.
In Anderson an amendment to a 1960 ordinance, which had
completely excluded mobile homes from the township, created a Trailer-1
zone, in which house trailers were expressly permissible. However, the
amendment set aside no land for the T-1 zone. The court held that since
the amendment did not designate any T-1 zone land, the ordinance was,
with respect to mobile homes, arbitrary and invalid, and therefore
ineffectual to prevent the intrusion of trailer parks into the township:
Defendants contend that the township zoning ordinance, as amended,
does not prohibit trailer parks in the township .... While the
amendment does, as indicated, make reference to a Trailer Coach
Park District, the record shows, as the trial court found, that, in
fact, the township has set aside no land for trailer coach parks....
The original ordinance prohibited trailer coach parks. The amending
ordinance in effect still prohibits trailer coach parks, by reason of
49
the failure to create a TR- 1 district.
In a few instances, however, an indirect virtual exclusion of mobile
homes has been sustained in a jurisdiction which does not sanction the
direct, total exclusion of house trailers. This occurred in Wright v.
Michaud"° and Township of Honey Brook v. Alenovitz. 51 In the Wright
case the zoning ordinance of the Town of Orono, Maine, excluded
individual mobile homes from the entire town but permitted a trailer court
46222 A.2d 315 (Del., 1966). Accord, June v. Lincoln Park, 361 Mich. 95, 104
N.W.2d 792 (1960).
4721 Mich. App. 64, 174 N.W.2d 909 (1970).
48222 A.2d at 319-320.
49 21 Mich. App. at 73-74, 174 N.W.2d at 913-914.
50160

Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964).

51430

Pa. 614, 243 A.2d 330 (1968).
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in one of the five zoning districts, as a special exception, upon the
approval of the Board of Zoning Appeals. The Supreme Court of Maine
affirmed a judgment sustaining the ordinance and denying a mobile home
owner's application for a permit to park his house trailer on a privately
owned lot in town, even though there was in fact no trailer park anywhere
in town. The court noted that the ordinance made provision for a trailer
park in a Residence and Farming Zone, whether or not an application to
establish such a park had ever been granted, and the court observed:
It will not be declared unconstitutional without clear and irrefutable
evidence that it infringes the paramount law.
If it [zoning law] does not appear unreasonable on its face, the
objecting party must produce evidence to show that it is, in fact,

unreasonable in its operation ....

52

In the Alenovitz case house trailers and trailer parks were, by
ordinance, excluded from the entire township except for four small tracts
called "Neighborhood Commercial," and no mobile homes were in fact
located in any of these four districts. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
nevertheless affirmed a judgment granting the township an injunction
ordering defendants to refrain from establishing a trailer park in another
district of the township, saying:
[A] zoning ordinance which totally excludes a particular business
from an entire municipality must bear a more substantial relationship
to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare than an
ordinance which merely confines that business to a certain area in
the municipality.... In the instant case there [is] no total exclusion.
... The assertion that these [allowable] areas are small hardly
overcomes the presumption of constitutionality.5
In summary, it would seem that a community desirous of absolutely
excluding mobile homes from its boundaries but lacking a compelling justification clearly related to the public health or safety has a somewhat better
chance of accomplishing its goal if it employs indirect means of exclusion;
but if the court perceives that the ostensibly innocent zoning scheme is
merely a fagade, then the ordinance will usually be deemed invalid.

VII. CONFINEMENT OF MOBILE HOMES TO TRAILER PARKS
The most common form of mobile home regulation, one that a
majority of communities has adopted, is confinement of house trailers to
trailer parks.54 Such confinement, generally accomplished by a local
ordinance enacted under the authority of a state enabling act, usually is
justified on one of the following two grounds: That the health and

160 Me. at 177, 200 A.2d at 550.
430 Pa. at 620, 243 A.2d at 333.
54 Supra note 32, at 240.

52

53
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sanitation problems inherent in mobile homes require periodic inspection,
and that control can be maintained more conveniently if such dwellings
are restricted to small areas; 55 or that the grouping of mobile homes
in trailer courts reduces the architectural disharmony which frequently
results when a house trailer is placed on a lot in a neighborhood
composed of conventional homes. 5 Since mobile homes-even the most
expensive ones--do not look like conventional houses, it is obvious
that the presence of a house trailer in a residential neighborhood will
57
impair the aesthetics of the area.
Ordinances restricting house trailers to trailer parks are usually
upheld, especially when the ordinance is consistent with a comprehensive
plan for the community.58 Among the cases sustaining such ordinances
60
are Bane v. Pontiac59 and People v. Clute.
In the Bane case the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed a
declaratory judgment that a township zoning ordinance restricting mobile
homes to trailer parks was related to the public health and was valid,
although having no effect on prior nonconforming uses. The court said:
"... . [A]n ordinance limiting the occupancy of trailers to licensed areas is
not an unreasonable exercise of the police power and is therefore valid.
...
We find nothing objectionable in this provision...-61
In the Clute case the Washington County Court affirmed a judgment
convicting defendant of violating a town ordinance restricting mobile
homes to trailer parks, commenting as follows:
In view of sewage, water supply, waste disposal and other problems
connected with the maintenance of trailers, permitting them in
trailer parks where these public services can be strictly supervised

55 Supra note 21, at 128.
56 Supra note 17, at 375-376.
57
This difference in appearance is sufficient to persuade many municipalities that
a mobile home in a conventional neighborhood will depress property values.
Many mobile dwellings are spacious, attractive and more completely equipped
for modem living than is true of many conventional homes. But they are
different, and the fact of difference renders them unwanted in conventional
residential neighborhoods.
Id. at 361.
58 Supra note 8, at 198.
59 343 Mich. 481, 72 N.W.2d 134 (1955).
6047 Misc.2d 1005, 263 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Accord, Cooper v. Sinclair, 66
So.2d 702 (Fla. 1953), and Davis v. Mobile, 245 Ala. 80, 16 So.2d 1 (1943). In the
latter case the court declared that the City of Mobile could very properly provide

regulations for trailer parking (exclusively in trailer parks) ".... as living quarters...
reasonably adapted to promote traffic convenience, safety, morals and health.
16 So.2d at 3.
61 343 Mich. at 492-93, 72 N.W.2d at 139, 140.
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In
indeed bears a relationship to the public health and welfare....
62
a residential district a trailer tends to lower land values.
However, in some states the enabling statute requires a comprehensive land use plan as a pre-condition to the passage of a zoning
ordinance, and in such jurisdictions the municipality's failure to develop
a comprehensive plan before enacting an ordinance confining mobile
65
homes to trailer parks has been deemed to invalidate the ordinance.
Although there is general agreement that ordinances restricting
mobile homes to trailer parks are legally justifiable, some observers have
been critical of the fact that trailer parks are often confined to industrial
4
or commercial districts. While mobile home use undeniably constitutes
a distinctive form of residential use, it is nevertheless a form of residential
use and would seem to be out of place in an industrial or commercial
area.65 The more logical and defensible approach would appear to be that
zone."
of restricting trailer parks to specified sections of a residential

VIII. EXCLUSION OF MOBILE HOMES THROUGH
THE APPLICATION OF RESTRICTIONS
DESIGNED FOR CONVENTIONAL HOMES
Even if a particular zoning ordinance does not expressly disallow
mobile homes in the municipality, or specifically restrict them to a
designated district, or confine them to trailer parks, a person seeking to

62 47 Misc.2d at 1007-08, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
63 The court so ruled in Milford v. Schmidt, 175 Neb. 12, 120 N.W.2d 262 (1963)
and in Astoria v. Nothwang, 221 Or. 452, 351 P.2d 688 (1960).
64 A recent survey disclosed that of 300 reporting municipal jurisdictions, industrial
locations were permitted in thirty-eight cases and they were the only areas allowable
in thirteen. Commercial locations were allowed in seventy-eight instances and were the
only permissible areas in fourteen. Supra note 14, at 17.
65 In Stevens v. Stillman, 186 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1959), an ordinance excluding trailer
parks from agricultural and residential districts but permitting them in commercial or
industrial districts was held unconstitutional. Said the court:
The Town of Clarence permits an establishment of trailer parks in a commercial
or industrial district but forbids the establishment and conduct of a trailer
park or camp in any part of an agricultural district.... Zoning laws.., must be
justified by the fact that they have some tendency to promote public health and
public safety or public welfare or, as otherwise expressed, must be of a direct,
substantial, or reasonable relation to the police. power.... I fail to see where
it is necessary to prohibit trailer camps in an agricultural district as far as
public health and public safety or public welfare are concerned.
84, 149
186 N.Y.S.2d at 328, 329, and 330. And in City of Aurora v. Bums, 319 Ill.
N.E. 784 (1925) an ordinance confining trailer parks to industrial districts was held
unconstitutional primarily because of the incompatibility of uses.
66 It is, of course, true that the operation of a mobile home park is a commercial
venture, just as the operation of most apartment houses is a commercial venture, but
the land use involved in a trailer park is, like the property use involved in an
apartment house, a residential use. "... ILliving in a mobile home is not a business. It
does not differ in kind or degree from living in any other kind of dwelling." Supra
note 13, at 498.
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place a house trailer on a lot located in the political subdivision may find
himself barred by zoning law provisions which may not, at first glance,
appear to apply to mobile homes. For example, a provision requiring a
minimum amount of square footage for all dwellings in the district may
have the practical effect of excluding house trailers. This result was
reached in Osetek v. Barone,67 where the ordinance required a minimum
floor area of at least 900 square feet. The court listened to testimony
that only about six percent of 'mobile homes have 900 or more square
feet but nevertheless upheld the ordinance and deemed it applicable
to house trailers, observing that the ordinance could not be said to be
discriminatory or arbitrary, since it had equal application to mobile
6
homes and conventional homes.
A similar problem arose in County of Will v. Stanfill,69 where the
defendants, who were in an area zoned "Residential-2," placed their
house trailers on lots much smaller than the 7,260 square feet required
by the zoning ordinance. When charged with violation of the ordinance,
defendants answered that they believed that the ordinance did not apply
to mobile homes. The court ruled that defendants' belief notwithstanding,
the minimum lot size requirement had the same application to mobile
70
homes that it did to conventional homes.
In New Orleans v. Louviere7 ' a zoning law provided for and regulated "single family dwellings." The question arose whether a house trailer
placed on blocks was a "dwelling" so as to qualify under the ordinance.
The Louisiana Court of Civil Appeals decided in the negative, saying:
A casual reflection upon the foregoing facts is convincing proof that
trailers, although containing living quarters and placed on blocks or
temporary foundations, merely for balance and to preserve the tires
which they ordinarily rest upon, which may again operate on the
highways at 7 2the caprice of the owners, are not single family
dwellings ....

Finally, in Lower Merion Township v. Gallup 73 the principal issue
was whether house trailers resting on jacks and boxes and which had the
67 60 Misc. 980, 304 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. CL 1968).
68 Accord, Kimsey v. City of Rome, 84 Ga. App. 671, 67 S.E.2d 206 (1951). Town
of Huntington v. Transon, 43 Misc.2d 912, 252 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
69 7 II1. App.2d 52, 129 N.E.2d 46 (App. Ct. 1955).
70Accord, Coming v. Ontario, 204 Misc. 38, 121 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1953). Here
the court rejected the trailer owner's contention that the ground area regulations did
not apply to him because his structure was not a "building," saying: "[Miobility
ceased when it was removed from the highway, attached to the soil, and occupied as
living quarters. A metamorphosis has occurred; the mobile vehicle has become a fixed
residence." 121 N.Y.S.2d at 291-292.
7152 So.2d 751 (La. App. 1951).
72 Id. at 752.
73 158 Pa. Super. 572, 46 A.2d 35 (1946).
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space between the floor and the ground enclosed with a shingle material
were "dwelling houses" within the meaning of a township ordinance
designating minimum requirements respecting light, air, sanitation, and
safety. The court ruled that the house trailers did classify as "dwelling
houses" and were required to comply with the designated standards. The
be
court noted that the house trailers were used and were intended to
were
trailers]
[house
these
that
say
"To
declared:
it
and
dwellings,
used as
74
a reality."
not dwellings is an attempt to fictionalize
The writer does not suggest that mobile homes should be exempt
requirements, lot sizes,
from ordinances prescribing minimum floor space
75
courts have generally
The
houses.
dwelling
for
standards
or light and air
justified as having
be
can
regulations
such
that
proposition
the
accepted
a bearing on the health and safety of the occupants of conventional
to the
houses,76 and this rationale would seem to have equal application
both
that
however,
suggest,
does
writer
The
occupants of mobile homes.
such
cases
from
profit
can
owners
home
mobile
and
drafters
ordinance
a
as the above four. Drafters can forestall litigation by merely inserting
trailers
house
where,
couple of sentences expressly indicating whether, and
are permitted and whether physical regulations pertaining to conventional
houses apply to mobile homes. Mobile home owners can avoid needless
expense and inconvenience by consulting and carefully reading the local

74 158 Pa. Super. at 575, 46 A.2d at 36. Accord, Huntington v. Transon, 43 Misc.2d
912, 252 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
75 The writer does not share the view, expressed by a recent article in the Cornell
and floor
Law Review, that mobile homes should be exempt from minimum lot size
living
space requirements and related regulations for the reason that mobile home
requirements
constitutes a different kind of life style, and that attempts to impose such
and
on mobile homes interfere with the expression of personal aesthetic tastes
constitute an unconstitutional abuse of the police power.
his property
What is involved is a question of the freedom of an owner to use of
the rights
in any way he sees fit as long as the use is not illegal or violative the individual
of others. ... As a matter of policy the question is simply... :Will
or must
desires,
his
homeowner be permitted to live in a manner that satisfies
is... a
he conform to the esthetic tastes of his neighbors? The question
fundamental one of the limit of the municipal power to make unreasonable
distinctions between various modes of construction and living.
Supra note 13, at 500 and 504.
All zoning restricts the freedom of the individual property owner and limits his
right to adopt alternative life styles. The basic question is not whether a property
owner's freedom is being curtailed, for it undeniably is, but whether such regulation
can be justified for reasons reasonably related to the public health, safety, or general
welfare. If one accepts the proposition that it is unhealthy or unsafe for a conventional
homeowner to live on a lot that is too small or in a house that is too little or too
dark or stuffy, then the same reasoning would, logically, apply to the owner of a
mobile home.
76 See County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450
(1967) (sustaining a five-acre minimum lot size and noting that minimum lot
requirements have more often than not been upheld as a valid means of promoting
a legitimate police power goal) and Ironshead Lake Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10
N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952) (sustaining a minimum floor space requirement).
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zoning ordinance before buying or renting a lot on which to park their
house trailer. If the local ordinance is ambiguous concerning its application to house trailers, the mobile home owner would be well advised to
consult the local zoning inspector, or an attorney, before attempting
to establish his house trailer on a site in the political subdivision.
IX. LIMITS ON DURATION OF STAY
A method of regulation that has the practical effect of excluding
many mobile homes from the community is to impose a time limit-such
as ninety days-on the parking of house trailers in the municipality. After
the designated time limit has passed the mobile home in question must be
removed from its site for a minimum specified time. This form of
regulation, which is still commonly used, originated back in the period
when mobile homes were truly mobile and were similar to the kinds of
vehicles that would now be classified as camping trailers. 77 During that
era trailer owners rarely parked their vehicle at any one place for an
extended time period, thus, a regulation was appropriate for the house
trailers of that period. 78 Today the vast majority of mobile home owners
live, rather than merely travel, in their house trailers and establish them
at fixed locations for long periods, frequently years. Thus a local
ordinance requiring removal of mobile homes at weekly, monthly or
quarterly intervals now has the effect of discouraging the great majority
of house trailer owners from coming into the community at all, an effect
that most municipalities still having such ordinances doubtlessly desire.
Somewhat surprisingly, recent, as well as older, decisions, have tended to
sustain such ordinances notwithstanding their anachronistic qualities. 79
Among cases upholding such ordinances are Gillam v. Board of Health of
Sangers80 and Hartland v. Jensen's, Inc.& In the former case the court
justified its upholding of an ordinance limiting occupancy to ninety days
in a six-month period by stating that the ordinance was a reasonable
restriction designed to maintain the transient character of local trailer
parks, which failed to meet the requirements of the local building
code. Quoting from the opinion: "The rule in question cannot be
pronounced lacking in rational purpose. In other states similar rules have

77 Supra note 17, at 376.
78

Those who still call these dwellings trailers do so out of an old habit that also

causes them to think of the places where they are gathered as "camps." This
habit is a*vestige of a day when the main kind of trailer you saw was one that
people with cars hauled around to sleep and cook in when they stopped briefly
here or there to work or maybe just sight-see. It was the kind of rolling dwelling
evoked by the old popular song that said, among other things, Let's take a trip
ina traiter....
Supra note 6, at 51-52.
79 Supra note 21, at 133.
80 327 Mass. 621, 100 N.E.2d 687 (1951).
81

146 Conn. 697, 155 A.2d 754 (1959).
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been held valid, as tending to prevent permanent occupation of dwelling
82
places which do not conform to the requirements of building codes."
In the Hartland controversy, the court sustained a municipal
ordinance limiting the occupancy of land by any automobile trailer or
other vehicle designed or used for human occupancy to a total of sixty
days. The court's rationale was that the ordinance was a reasonable
exercise of the police power, since the town properly could have
determined that its resources were such that temporary occupancy of land
within its borders by trailers and mobile homes was feasible but that
permanent occupancy would overtax the abilities of the town to cope
with the health and safety problems which would arise.82
In a jurisdiction such as New Jersey or Ohio, which openly sanctions
the complete exclusion of mobile homes from an entire political
subdivision, ordinances merely restricting the duration of stay, even
severely, obviously cannot be challenged. However, in the remaining
jurisdictions the retention of such ordinances would seem to constitute
an attempt to accomplish by indirection that which cannot be directly and
openly done. That such ordinances, designed for the camper-style house
trailer of yesterday, have no relevance to the situation created by the
development of the modern mobile home is apparent, and it is difficult to
understand why the courts generally have not yet recognized this fact.
X.

MOBILE HOMES CONSIDERED AS
NONCONFORMING USES
Generally speaking, zoning laws can only operate prospectively, and
an inconsistent land use antedating a new zoning ordinance can continue
operation provided that it does not constitute a nuisance and does not
expand8 4 This principle has usually been applied to mobile homes. Thus,
it has been held that a mobile home8 5 or a trailer court 86 which existed
prior to the enactment of an ordinance banning such a land use may
continue as a nonconforming use. Acting consistently with the general

82

327 Mass. at 623, 100 N.E.2d at 688.

83 Accord, Loose v. Battle Creek, 309 Mich. 1, 14 N.W.2d 554 (1944)

(sustaining an
ordinance restricting the parking of mobile homes to six weeks during a twelve-month
period) and Southport v. Ross, 284 App. Div. 598, 132 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1954)
(upholding a municipal ordinance limiting the parking of mobile homes to four weeks
in a twelve-month period).
84 D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW, 146-147

1971). Admittedly, a number of jurisdictions have accepted the principle of the
amortization of nonconforming uses. In these jurisdictions the owner of the nonconforming use is permitted to continue his operation only for a period of time long
enough to enable him to recover his original investment. See Moore, The Termination
of Nonconforming Uses, 6 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1 (1965).
85 Des Jardin v. Greenfield, 262 Wis. 43, 53 N.W.2d 784 (1952).
86 Nicholson v. Wyatt, 77 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1955).
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principle that actual use is essential to the establishment of a nonconforming use, the courts have held that no right to a nonconforming
use has been acquired where the property owner has simply cleared
the land for the purpose of creating a trailer park there,87 or has
merely formulated plans to construct a mobile home park.88
However, conduct which might be deemed to be mere preparation
for use and therefore insufficient to establish most nonconforming uses
has been held adequate to confer the right to operate a mobile home park.
Thus, in Meuser v. Smith8 9 the excavation of a foundation and the
pouring of footings for a utility building to serve a trailer park was
ruled adequate to create a nonconforming use, and in City of Belleville
v. Leonard9" the mere acquisition of land and the installation of
water and sewer lines was ruled sufficient to establish the right to
operate a nonconforming trailer park.91
Furthermore, the courts appear to be more lenient about the
expansion of nonconforming mobile homes and trailer parks than they
are about the expansion of nonconforming uses in general. 92 Illustrative
cases are Ohio v. Mink, 93 Watts v. City of Helena,94 and Board of County
Commissioners v. Petsch.95 In the first case the owner of a nonconforming
mobile home was permitted to replace his original house trailer with a
new one of no greater length, even though this would obviously have
the effect of prolonging the nonconforming use. 96 In the Watts case the
defendant owned a group of contiguous lots. At the time of the enactment
of the ordinance banning house trailers the defendant already had trailers
on some of the lots, but not on the others. The ordinance provided that a
person who had a nonconforming use on his property could continue the
A & P Mobilehome Court, Inc., v. Town of Groton, 21 Conn. Supp. 275, 154
A.2d 243 (Super. Ct. 1959). Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.W.2d 828
(1949).
88 Ohio St. Student Trailer Park Coop. v. Franklin County, 68, Ohio L. Abs. 563,
123 N.E.2d 286 (C.P. 1953); David A. Ulrich, Inc., v. Saukville, 7 Wis.2d 173, 96
N.W.2d 612 (1959); Clover Hill Farms v. Lehigh Township Bd., 5 Pa. Commonwealth
239, 289 A.2d 778 (1972) (owner of land had invested $3,000 in the preparation of
plans and the making of percolation tests).
89 74 OHIo L. Aas. 417, 141 N.E.2d 209 (App. Ct. 1956).
90 108 Ill. App. 2d 26, 246 N.E.2d, 464 (1969).
91 Accord, New London v. Leskiewicz, 272 A.2d 856 (N.H. 1971), which involved
a park for camping trailers.
92
Supra note 14, at 39 and 41.
9326 Ohio St. 2d 142, 269 N.E.2d 921 (1971).
94151 Mont. 138, 439 P.2d 767 (1968).
95 172 Neb. 263, 109 N.W.2d 388 (1961).
96 Contra, Town of Windham v. Sprague, 219 A.2d 548 (Me. 1966).
If it is proper to substitute a new trailer for an old one, it would follow that
this same process could be repeated again and again. Thus the life of the
nonconforming use would be prolonged indefinitely. This is contrary to
the principle that nonconforming uses should be eliminated as early as possible.
87
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same and, in addition, could extend it "throughout his premises,"
apparently meaning throughout the remainder of the individual lot. The
court allowed the defendant to establish mobile homes on his remaining
lots, saying that since defendant clearly had acquired a nonconforming use
on some of his lots, he should be permitted to extend his nonconforming
use throughout the remaining lots constituting his total premises. Finally,
in the Petsch controversy the landowner had placed thirteen trailers on
his property and had partially prepared the sites for fifty-nine additional
trailers. The court permitted him to establish mobile homes on the
fifty-nine prepared but vacant sites, saying:
Open areas in connection with an improvement existing at the time
of the adoption of zoning regulations are exempt from such
regulations as a nonconforming use, if such open areas were in use
or partially used in connection with the use existing when the
regulations were adopted .... In other words, where a trailer court
project is partially completed when zoning regulations become
effective, and the evidence is clear as to the extent of the project,
will ordinarily determine the scope of the
the completed project
97
nonconforming use.
In summary, the courts have treated nonconforming house trailers
and trailer parks essentially the same way as they normally treat
nonconforming uses. However, they have exhibited a marked tendency
toward leniency in deciding when the landowner has done enough
to acquire a nonconforming house trailer and in determining when
the landowner's proposed changes constitute an expansion of his
nonconforming mobile home use.

XI. PRIVATE COVENANTS BANNING MOBILE HOMES
Although the number of reported cases involving private covenants
9
concerning house trailers is small, 8 most of such cases have honored
an attempt to exclude mobile homes from a subdivision of conventional
homes. At least four cases have arisen involving the proposed use of
9
single-family residentially restricted land for trailer park purposes. 9 As
one might suppose, in all four instances the court ruled that the
contemplated use would transgress the private restrictions. Since a
trailer court more closely approximates an apartment house than it does
a single-family dwelling, this result seems entirely reasonable. In one of

97

172 Neb. at 268, 109 N.W.2d, at 391-392.

The

authors of a 1970 article in the CORNELL LAW REVIEW stated that they were
able to find only nine such cases reported subsequent to 1940. Supra note 13, at 515.
99 Hallet v. Sumpter, 106 F. Supp. 996 (Alaska, D.C. 1952); Reetz v. Ellis, 279 Ala.
453, 186 So.2d 915 (1966); Grange v. Korf, 248 Iowa 118, 79 N.W.2d 743 (1956),
98

and Foos v. Engle, 295 Ky. 114, 174 S.W.2d 5 (1943).
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the cases, 10 however, the court indicated that use of the land for a
trailer court would violate a covenant against a "noxious or offensive
trade or business." Although a trailer park is indisputably operated
for purposes of profit, such use of land would not seem to properly
classify as a business use any more than an apartment house does. It
would appear to be more realistic to treat trailer parks as a form of
multiple-dwelling residential use.
The cases involving the application of private covenants to attempts
to place a mobile home on an individually owned lot have turned mainly
on the clarity of the covenant relied on to bar the invading mobile
home, and to a lesser extent, on the general suitability of the area for
house trailers. In the following cases the courts have held that mobile
homes were barred by a private covenant: Pagel v. Gisi,""1 where the
restriction provided that the land "will be used for dwelling houses only";
Jones v. Berber,102 where the covenant stated that no "garage, trailer,
shack or hut shall be used for living purposes"; Swigart v. Richards,10 3
where the covenant declared that "no building shall be erected or
maintained upon any lot except one residence designed and used for
occupation by a single family," and McBride v. Behrnan,1°4 where the
covenant disallowed "temporary dwellings" and "unsightly structures." 10 5
By contrast, in the following three instances the courts have ruled
that an allegedly exclusionary covenant was not sufficiently explicit to bar
mobile homes: Schaefler v. Gatling,10 6 where the covenant merely stated
that "no residences shall be erected ... which shall cost less than
$6,000";107 Naiman v. Bilodeau,108 where the covenant limited use of the
land to residential purposes and stated that an acceptable dwelling "must
have an asphalt roof and clapboard siding or better,"' 09 and Yeager v.

100 Hallet v. Sumpter, 106 F. Supp, 996 (Alaska, D.C. 1952).
101 132 Colo. 181, 286 P.2d 636 (1955).
102 251 Iowa 969, 103 N.W.2d 364 (1960).
103 87 Ohio L. Abs. 37, 178 N.E.2d 109 (C.P. 1961).
10428 Ohio Misc. 47, 272 N.E.2d 181 (C.P. 1971).
105In the McBride case the court noted that the neighborhood was an attractive and
relatively affluent residential area.
106 243 Miss. 155, 137 So.2d 819 (1962).
107 Here the defendants purchased a mobile home which cost more than $6,000,
brought it to their lot, and placed it on a foundation of concrete piers.
108225 A.2d 758 (Me. 1967).

109 The court decided that the aluminum siding and roof of defendants' mobile home
exceeded the minimum quality requirements of the covenant.
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Cassidy,n0 where the covenant prohibited everything except "one private
dwelling costing at least $5,000 and resting on a solid foundation.""'
It is clear that mobile homes can validly be excluded from a
residential subdivision by use of a private covenant that is sufficiently
explicit and clear. n 2 In the writer's judgment, this is as it should be.
Conceding that the most expensive house trailers are in some respects
more attractive and functional than are many conventional homes, and
conceding that the distinction between mobile homes and conventional
homes may become blurred as home-building techniques evolve away from
on-site methods toward factory-production systems, nevertheless, the
differences between the typical house trailer of today and the average
conventional home appear substantial enough to justify the honoring of
attempts to keep the former away from the immediate vicinity of the latter.
XII. CONCLUSION
Although it may continue to change somewhat in size and
appearance, the mobile home is with us to stay and appears destined to
serve a greater percentage of our society's housing needs in the future
than it does today. In the long run, therefore, municipalities and
townships have no choice but to reach an accommodation with the
house trailer. In the writer's view such an accommodation should, except
in special and unusual circumstances, entail the elimination of local
ordinances which: exclude house trailers from the entire municipality;
restrict trailer parks to industrial and/or commercial zones, or limit the
duration of stay of mobile homes to a few days, weeks, or months. On
the other hand, local authorities appear quite justified in retaining, or
adding, such restrictions as the following: confining house trailers to
trailer parks; demanding that mobile home owners and trailer court
operators abide by the minimum lot size requirements for the district in
which the trailer court is located,"13 and limiting trailer parks to a

11020 Ohio Misc. 251, 253 N.E.2d 320 (C.P. 1969).
111 Here the defendant placed his $5,500 mobile home on a concrete foundation. The
court invoked the canon that covenants should be narrowly construed so as to
maximize freedom of land use.
112 Supra note 32, at 263.
113 Since mobile home court operators still commonly attempt to establish as many
house trailer sites on an acre of land as is feasibly possible, a restriction of this kind
may be expected to encounter stiff resistance from prospective trailer park operators,
as well as from existing operators who plan to expand. An alternative arrangement
that assures the same amount of open space and sometimes encounters less resistance
from subdividers (including trailer court operators) is to impose a "cluster zoning"
restriction. Under this kind of ordinance the subdivider (or trailer park operator) is
permitted to reduce his individual lot sizes by a given percentage if he dedicates an
equivalent amount of land elsewhere in the development (or trailer park) for open
space use. See Chrinko v. Planning Board, 77 N.J. 594, 187 A.2d 221 (Super Ct.
1963), a leading case upholding and explaining cluster zoning.
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specified section of the municipality. Finally, trailer park operators
would be well advised to recognize that communities would almost
certainly be less hostile to trailer courts if mobile home owners would
bear a fairer share of the community's tax burden and if the less
socially conscious park operators would provide their courts with
U4
landscaping, paved inner roads, and open spaces.

114 Under the doctrine of contract rezoning, which has been accepted by such
jurisdictions as Massachusetts and New York, a municipality can condition its granting
of an application for a zoning change to permit a trailer park (or other land use) on
the applicant's agreement to provide such amenities. See Church v. Town of Islip, 8
N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960) and Sylvania Elec. Prods.,
Inc., v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962).
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